

R 232202Z NOV 93  
FM USINT HAVANA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5934

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 006938

S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: [PTER](#) [CU](#)  
SUBJECT: CUBA: 1993 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 317207

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. THE SEVERE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN CUBA FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM IN EUROPE HAS IMPOSED LIMITS ON CUBAN CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM ON ANYTHING LIKE PAST LEVELS. POST IS NOT AWARE OF NEW EVIDENCE IN 1993 OF CUBAN MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR ARMED INSURGENCIES. NEVERTHELESS, CUBA MAINTAINS CLOSE RELATIONS WITH MOST "TERRORIST STATES" AND CONTINUES TO SERVE AS A REFUGE FOR KNOWN TERRORISTS. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS. IN AN EFFORT TO APPEAL TO FELLOW LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, THE CUBAN REGIME HAS PUBLICLY TRIED TO DISTANCE ITSELF FROM REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN THE HEMISPHERE. ENDING SUPPORT FOR THE GUERRILLAS IN COLOMBIA WAS SAID TO HAVE BEEN A PRE-CONDITION FOR FIDEL CASTRO'S VISIT TO CARTAGENA AUGUST 9-11, AND WAS PART OF THE JUSTIFICATION THE COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT GAVE FOR RESTORING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH HAVANA IN LATE OCTOBER. AS FOR GUATEMALA, THE OTHER COUNTRY MOST AFFECTED BY FORMERLY CUBAN-BACKED REBELS, THE OFFICIAL CUBAN PRESS MADE GUARDEDLY CONCILIATORY STATEMENTS TOWARD THE PEACE PROCESS THERE DURING THE VISIT OF NOBEL LAUREATE RIGOBERTA MENCHU TO HAVANA IN EARLY AUGUST.

¶3. (U) RELATIONS WITH TERRORIST STATES. CUBA HAS FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA. ALL THESE COUNTRIES HAVE EMBASSIES IN HAVANA, AS DOES CUBA IN EACH OF THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND NORTH KOREA ARE PARTICULARLY CLOSE AND HIGH PROFILE. THE PLO IS ALSO REPRESENTED HERE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.

¶4. (U) PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM. THE REGIME-CONTROLLED CUBAN PRESS IS CAREFUL TO ESCHEW EXPLICIT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISTS. NEVERTHELESS THERE PERSISTS A SLANT SYMPATHETIC TO "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" AND SELF-STYLED MARXIST MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE SHINING PATH. IN ADDITION THE STRIDENT ANTI-U.S. LINE WHICH PERVADES CUBAN NEWS AND COMMENTARY SPILLS OVER INTO ATTACKS ON U.S. COUNTERTERROR ACTIVITIES SUCH AS THE SANCTIONS ON LIBYA, WHICH THE CUBANS HOLD UP AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE WEST'S "DOUBLE STANDARD. AFTER YEARS OF ONE-SIDED COVERAGE OF PALESTINIAN ISSUES, THE CUBAN PRESS TREATED THE SEPTEMBER PEACE ACCORD RELATIVELY OBJECTIVELY.

¶5. (U) HARBORING/TRAINING FOREIGN TERRORISTS. POST IS NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN IN 1993. BASQUE TERRORISTS WHO SOUGHT REFUGE HERE SOME YEARS AGO REMAIN, BUT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED THE SPANISH EMBASSY THAT NO FURTHER ASYLEES WOULD BE ACCEPTED. SEVERAL THOUSAND FOREIGN STUDENTS FROM FORMER MARXIST REGIMES LIKE SOUTH YEMEN OR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS SUCH AS THE POLISARIO OR THE SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT CONTINUE TO ATTEND SPECIAL SCHOOLS ON THE ISLE OF YOUTH. HOWEVER THE MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY COMPONENT OF THESE PROGRAMS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN REDUCED OR LARGELY ELIMINATED, AND THE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS HAVE DECLINED, WITH FEW IF ANY NEW ARRIVALS.

¶6. (U) THERE HAVE BEEN NO PROSECUTIONS OR EXTRADITIONS OF TERRORISTS MADE PUBLIC IN CUBA IN 1993.

SULLIVAN